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Libertarianism and Austrian economics.” Block’s thesis that human behavior is 
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Counterarguments include the observation that humans are not exempt from the 
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I.  Introduction   
   
Professor  Walter  Block  in  his  short  paper,  Free  Will,  Determinism,  Libertarianism  
and  Austrian  Economics  has  taken  on  a  herculean  task.     
   
In  his  attempt  to  resolve  the  ancient  debate  of  free  will  versus  determinism,  
Block (unpublished) has  seemingly  banished  from  the  libertarian  movement  all  
those  who  disagree  with  his  view  on  free  will  including  the  authors  of  this  paper  
and,  as  we  shall  show,  Herbert  Spencer,  and  the  great  Austrian  school  scholars  
Ludwig  von  Mises  and  Friedrich  Hayek.   
   
Further,  as  we  shall  also  show,  Block  introduces  Heisenberg's  uncertainty  principle  
and  does  so  in  a  manner  that    challenges  Albert  Einstein  on  the  topic.     
   
The  authors  of  this  paper  espouse  somewhat  differing  views  on  the  final  nature  
and  ultimate  cause  of  determinism,  but  all  steadfastly  hold  to  the  idea  that  a  
determinist,  regardless  of  the  origins  and  details  of  his  view,  can  be  a  libertarian,  
just  as  a  person  who  holds  a  free  will  perspective  can  be  a  libertarian.   
   
Since  Block  has  professed that  he  is  a  “devout  atheist”,  we  will  address  his  
argument  in  favor  of  free  will  from  a  non-­theological  perspective.  We assume 
he  is  not  attempting  to  introduce  the  concept  of  free  will  for  any  theological  
reasons1.     
   
We  will  end  by  addressing  what  we,  the  authors,  regard  as  a  grave  error  on  
Block’s  part  in  declaring  that  a  determinist  cannot  be  a  libertarian.  In section II 
we offer some definitions. The burden of section III is to challenge Block’s arguments 
against determinism.  We conclude in section IV that both the free will position and 
deterministic positions are compatible with libertarian philosophy.  
 
 
II.  Definitions   
   
Block defines determinism this way:     
   
“Determinism  is  the  view  that  since  everything  has  a  cause,  this  applies  to  
human  action  as  well.  This implies that people are not free to choose.  Their  supposed  
                                                          
1]  We  recognize  that  some  hold  their  views  on  free  will  based  on  their  religious  views,  
however,  that  is  not  the  subject  of  this  paper.   
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choices  are  actually  caused  by  historical  events,  including  the  makeup  of  their  
brains.  In  this  view,  free  choices  are  a  will  o [sic]  the  wisp;;  seemingly,  we  
have  them,  but,  actually  they  are  a  mirage.  We  are  not  really  free  to  engage  in  
acts  other  than  the  ones  we  actually  undertake.”   
   
This  definition  by  itself  is  not  problematic  but,  because  of  the  faulty  conclusions  
that  follow  it  in  Block (unpublished),  we  present  the  following  immediate  points  
which  will  be  elaborated  upon  throughout  our  discussion:     
   
1. Contrary  to  Block’s  assertion,  individuals  can  and  do  make  choices  in  a  
deterministic  world.  If  given  a  choice,  for  example,  they  could  choose  whether  
to  drink  scotch  or  soda.  These  are  not  “free”  choices,  meaning  free  will  is  not  
the  proximate  cause  of  the  choice.  They  are  choices  in  that  there  is  no  external  
constraint  on  their  drink  selection.  People  could  have  chosen  the  soda  if  they  
had,  in  fact,  picked the  scotch.  But suppose their goal was to remain sober.  If  they  
actually  had  free  will,  no  prior  brain  events  could  have  stopped  them  from  just  
saying  “no”  to  the  scotch.   
 
2. According  to  free  will  advocates,  our  will  floats  in  space  somewhere  outside  
the  brain.  It emanates from our brain.  Consequently,  in  either  a  free  will  or  
deterministic  world,  if  one  had  chosen  the  scotch,  the  antecedent  brain  events  
would  have  been  in  place  to  make  this  choice.  Whether  we  call  the  proximate  
antecedent  “free  will”  or  “neurons  firing,”  there  exists  in  both  views  a  prior  
cause.     
   
The  following  is  the  best  definition  of  free  will  Block (unpublished, p. 2)2  provides  
in  his  paper:     
   
“Free will takes the diametric opposite position.  It  maintains  that  we  could  have  
acted  other  than  we  actually  did.  Yes,  there  are  causal  connections  in  life,  in  
chemistry,  in  physics,  and  some  of  what  occurs  to  us  is  completely  causal  and  
apart  from  our  will,  there  are  some  that  are  only  partially  under  our  control,  but  
there  are  at  least  some  actions  over  which  we  have  complete  control.”   
   
To clarify, free will is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as, “1. Voluntary 
choice or decision; 2. Freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by 
prior causes or divine intervention.”  It is the  notion  that  individuals  have  the  ability  
to  make  some  decisions  independent  of  their  brain  structure,  genetics  and  
experiences.  This  raises  a  clear  problem:  If  you  have  free  will,  why  not  always  
do  everything  you  want  that  is  good  for  you?  Why  would  you  not:  adhere  to  
your  diet,  exercise  regularly,  avoid  worry,  never  fly  into  a  rage  etc.?  If  you  
have  free  choice,  you  would  freely  choose  to  avoid  procrastinating,  worrying,  
and  raging.  Block  fails  to  address  this  contradiction  in  his  free  will  stance.   
   
Block  concedes  a  cause  and  effect  relationship  in  certain  aspects  of  human  action  
in  the  aforementioned  definition.  Although  he  claims  to  be  a  free  will  advocate,  
here  he  adheres  to  compatibilism.     
   
                                                          
2] Unless otherwise specified, all quotes from Block refer to this one article of his, Block (unpublished.) 
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He  eventually  also  makes  the  following  statement:  “The  basic  premise  of  the  
determinist  position  is  that  all  is  caused.  If  you  do  not  believe  this,  they  charge,  
you  are  unscientific.  The  brain,  in  particular,  is  a  physical  organ,  subject  to  all  
the  cause  and  effect  relationships  that  apply  to  any  other  bit  of  physical  matter.”     
   
However,  Block  fails  to  explain  how  the  brain  is  a  special  kind  of  matter  exempt  
from  the  laws  of  science.  Instead,  shortly  following  the  aforementioned  statement  
and  a  brief  mental  experiment  which  we  will  address  later,  Block  begins  to  
invoke  some  of  the  greatest  conundrums  of  the  universe  in  an  attempt  to  support  
his  argument  that  free  will  is  true  doctrine  and  that  determinism  is  not.  Block 
does this, for example, by introducing Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the Big 
Bang theory:     
 
“What about Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?  Doe  [sic]  this  not  mean,  
particularly  at  the  molecular  or  electronic  level,  that  there  is  a  break  between  
cause  and  effect?  If  so,  there  is  an  exception  to  the  cause  and  effect  assumption.  
What caused the Big Bang?  What caused whatever caused the Big Bang?  This  would  
appear  to  be  yet  another  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  all  events  are  caused.  
Do  we  not  become  involved  in  an  infinite  regress  if  we  keep  pushing  back  
along  this  chain  of  supposed  causes  and  effects?  If  not,  if  there  are  indeed 
exceptions  to  this  rule,  why  cannot  free  will  be  another  exception?”   
   
Here,  Block’s  first  error  is  in  attributing  to  determinists  a  perspective  of  how  
the  universe  was  formed.  One  can  hold  a  determinist  view  as  to  the  structure  
of  the  brain  and  how  choices  are  made  without  examining  how  the  world  was  
formed.  That  is,  in  the  same  manner  in  which  a  determinist  can  hold  that  2+2=4,  
a  determinist  can  certainly  hold  a  perspective  on  how  the  brain  is  structured  and  
why  choices  result  without  in  either  case  delving  into  the  beginnings  of  the  
universe.   
   
But let us entertain this straw man3 a bit.  Although  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  
paper  to  consider  the  many  theories  of  the  origins  of  the  universe,  it  seems  
appropriate  to  comment  on  Block’s  representation  of  the  Heisenberg  uncertainty  
principle  since  he  calls  upon  this  principle  in  particular  as  he  tries  to  establish  
a  reason  to  doubt  cause  and  effect.  Block  tells  us  that  the  Heisenberg  principle  
states:  “at  the  molecular  or  electronic  level,  that  there  is  break  between  cause  
and  effect.”   
   
This is simply a misunderstanding of the principle.  The  uncertainty  principle,  is  not  
about  cause  and  effect,  it  is  about  simultaneous  measurement.  Specifically,  the  
uncertainty  principle  holds  that  precise,  simultaneous  measurement  of  some  
complementary  variables  -­-­  such  as  the  position  and  momentum  of  a  subatomic  
particle  -­-­  is  impossible. There is no denial of cause and effect.     
   
                                                          
3] Referring to the informal fallacy in which one gives the impression of providing a rebuttal to their 
opponent’s argument by replacing the initial argument with a proposition of their own, proceeding to 
refute their own proposition instead of the original proposition.   
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Many  scientists  -­  including  Albert  Einstein4  -­  do  not  consider  the  Heisenberg  
uncertainty  principle  to  mean  that  nature  is  not  absolute.  Rather,  the  Heisenberg  
uncertainty  principle  simply  illustrates  that  human  knowledge  about  the  absolute  
nature  of  the  universe  is  limited.     
   
Einstein  believed  ”…quantum  theory  could  give  us  only  a  partial  description  of  
nature.  He  thought  that  Heisenberg's  discovery  showed  that  human  knowledge  is  
limited,  but  he  also  thought  that  nature  is  absolute.  That  is,  he  thought  that  there  
is  no  "uncertainty"  in  nature,  and  that  the  uncertainty  exists  only  in  our  knowledge  
about  it.”   
   
The  fact  that  it  is  necessary  for  Block  to  attempt  to  invoke  the  deepest  mysteries  
of  the  universe  in  order  to  justify  the  plausibility  of  his  argument  is  telling  of  
the  wholesale  lack  of  evidence  to  support  it.     
   
III. Arguments Against Determinism   
   
After  Block  defines  determinism  and  briefly  explains  free  will,  he  presents  this  
argument:     
   
“Scenario  1:  Joe  is  asked  to  choose  between  an  apple  and  a  banana.  He chooses 
the apple.   
   
“Scenario  2:  Under  gunpoint,  Joe  is  compelled  to  choose  between  these  two  
fruits.  However, if he chooses the banana he will be shot.  He chooses the apple.   
   
“For  the  free  will  advocate  there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  the  two  cases:  
one  is  freely    chosen,  the  other  is  chosen  under  duress.  For  the  determinist  there  
is  no  difference:  both  choices  are  caused,  albeit  by  different  preliminary  events.  
This is a reductio ad absurdum.  The word ‘compulsion’ is shorn of its usual meaning;;  
Indeed, of any meaning at all.  The  first  case  is  clearly  an  example  of  free  will;;  
The second, compulsion.”   
   
It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  Block  believes  he  is  presenting  a  reductio  ad  
absurdum.  In  scenario  2  an  outside  factor  is  introduced,  a  person  initiating  force  
with  a  gun.  It  is  clear  how  this  has  an  influence  on  Joe’s  choice  and  that  such  
an  influence  can  be  called  compulsion.  That  is,  a  person  threatening  Joe  with  a  
gun  forces  or  coerces  Joe  to  act  in  a  manner  he  may  not  have  otherwise.  This  
is  a  perfectly  legitimate  use  of  the  word  compulsion  and  differentiates  it  from  
other  acts  where  coercion  is  not  involved.   
   
Moreover  Block  engages  in  circular  reasoning  to  bolster  his  free  will  argument.  
He  asserts  without  supporting  evidence  “the  first  case  is  clearly  an  example  of  
                                                          
4] We  introduce  Einstein  here  in  an  attempt  not  to  Argumentum  ad  Verecundiam  but  merely  to  
point  out  that  the  Heisenberg  principle  is,  itself,  not  settled  as  far  as  science  is  concerned.  We  
hold  that  a  position  on  the  validity  of  the  Heisenberg  principle,  contra  Block,  has  no  
implications  for  the  free  will-­determinism  debate,  and  that  the  uncertainty  about  the  
Heisenberg  principle  merely  adds  another  level  of  concern  as  to  the  value  of  its  introduction  
into  this  paper.   
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free  will;;”.  Yet  this  is  the  premise  he  presumably  is  trying  to  prove  in  his  
essay.     
   
Block  then  creates  a  strawman  argument  with  regard  to  the  determinist  position  
on  punishment.  He writes:   
   
“Joe shoots an innocent person to death.  He is caught and sentenced to punishment.  
He says at his sentencing, “But, I’m a determinist.    I had no choice.  Given  historical  
and  biological  and  other  such  causal  events,  I  had  to  shoot  that  person.  I could 
not have done otherwise than I did.”  The defendant’s case is invalid.  But the 
determinist would agree with this murderer.  The  determinist,  as  a  so-­called  
libertarian,  might  well  still  support  using  violence  to  prevent  him  from  doing  so  
again.  However,  if  we  stipulate,  arguendo,  that  this  criminal  will  never  ever  
murder  anyone  else,  or,  indeed,  not  violate  any  aspect  of  the  non-­aggression  
principle  (NAP)  again,  the  determinist’s  position  implies  we  should  let  this  
individual  go;;  that he is not blameworthy.  The determinist’s position is thus forward 
looking.  In  contrast,  from  the  free  will  libertarian  position,  it  is  only  pragmatic  
or  utilitarian  to  be  forward  looking  in  this  manner.  The    true libertarian is 
backward looking.  We  don’t  care  (except  for  pragmatic  or  utilitarian    
considerations)  what  the  future  will  bring.  As deontological libertarians, we care 
only about what happened previously.  Joe committed murder in the past.  That and that 
alone justifies punishing him now.  From  the  deterministic  position,  there  cannot  
even  be  such  a  thing  as  ‘punishment.’   
   
“There  can  only  be  “taking  murderers  out  of  circulation”  so  that  they  don’t  
commit  murder  in  the  future.”   
   
Here,  Block  overlooks  two  very  strong  reasons  that  a  determinist  could  be  in  
favor  of  punishment  of  a  criminal,  that  is  for  reasons  of  restitution  and  for  
reasons  of  deterrence.  Indeed,  once  an  individual  has  committed  a  criminal  act,  
to  the  determinist,  whether  he  will  do  it  again  or  not,  does  not  necessarily  have  
to  be  considered,  since  punishment  will  act  as  a  deterrence  to  other  potential  
criminals  and  there  is  no  reason  that  a  determinist  would  necessarily  be  against  
this.   
   
But  further,  although  holding  the  free  will  perspective,  the  father  of  modern  
libertarianism,  Murray  Rothbard,  in  The  Ethics  of  Liberty,  considered  restitution  
of  primary  importance  in  punishment  of  criminals.  He wrote:   
   
“The  first  point  is  that  emphasis  in  punishment  must  be  not  on  paying  one’s  
debt  to  ‘society,’  whatever  that  means  but  on  paying  one’s  ‘debt’  to  the  
victim...prisons  would  not  disappear  in  the  libertarian  society,  but  they  would  
undoubtedly  change  drastically,  since  their  goal  would  be  to  force  the  criminals  
to  provide  restitution  to  victims.”     
   
There  is  nothing  in  Rothbard’s  view  here  that  a  determinist  could  not  agree  
with.  It  is  not  about  the  reason  a  criminal  does  something,  (determinist  or  
otherwise)  but  that  the  primary  focus  in  a  libertarian  society  should  be  on  
restitution.  But  restitution  is  a  topic  that  Block  entirely  ignores  in  his  paper.  It  
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is  not  only  a  very  important  primary  consideration  for  Rothbard,  but  certainly  
for  determinists.   
   
Block  then  goes  on  to  make  a  claim  that  is  even  more  difficult  to  understand.   
   
He writes:  “Another  difficulty  for  the  determinist  philosophy  is  that  it  runs  counter  
to  Austrian  economics.  One  of  the  key  elements  of  this  school  of  the  dismal  
science  is  methodological  dualism:  that  a    different  perspective  must  be  brought  
to  bear  in  the  study  of  human  action,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  physical  world,  
on  the  other.  Since  under  determinism  man  is  merely  in  effect  a  machine,  
contrary  to  Austrianism,  there  is  no  need  for  a  separate  method  to  study  these  
two  very  different  [sic]  aspects  of  reality....   
   
“What is methodological dualism?  It can be defined in this way (source:  
http://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Methodological_dualism;;  footnotes omitted):   
   
“  ‘Methodological  dualism  is  an  epistemological  position  which  holds  that  it  is  
necessary,  based  on  our  current  levels  of  knowledge  and  understanding,  to  utilize  
a  different  methodology  in  our  attempts  to  analyze  the  actions  of  human  beings  
than  the  methodology  used  in  the  physical  sciences  (i.e.  physics, biology etc...)  to 
study external events.  This  position  is  based  on  the  presupposition  that  humans  
differ  fundamentally  from  other  objects  in  the  external  world  in  that  humans  act,  
or  in  other  words  use  means  to  achieve  ends,  while  other  objects  in  nature,  such  
as  stones,  planets,  molecules  and  atoms  do  not.  Furthermore,  we  do  not  at  
present  know  how  external  events  affect  an  individual's  ‘thoughts,  ideas,  and  
judgements  of  value’  and  this  ignorance  forces  us  to  adopt  a  dualistic  approach  
to  the  two  classes  of  phenomena.’   
   
“  ‘This  view  was  emphasized  by  Ludwig  von  Mises  and  formed  the  central  
basis  of  his    epistemology.  Methodological  dualism,  especially  in  Mises's  case,  
was  a  reaction  to  the  notion  held  by  groups  such  as  the  logical  positivists  that  
the  study  of  human  action,  and  as  such  economics,  should  utilize  the  same  
experimental  scientific  method  as  the  physical  sciences,  a  view  that  has  been  
referred  to  by  Mises,  Friedrich  Hayek  and  others  as  scientism.  The  alternative  
methodology  that  Mises  developed  and  utilized  for  his  study  of  human  action  
was  praxeology, which  formed  the  basis  for  his  work  in  economics.  Praxeology  
differs  from  the  mainstream  neoclassical  approach  to  economics,  in  that  the  
mainstream  approach  utilizes  the  same  overall  methodology  as  the  physical  
sciences  in  an  attempt  to  develop  economic  theories  and  predict  future  economic.’   
   
“It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of this point.”   
   
In  this  instance,  Block  simply  fails  to  correctly  understand  Mises  and  Hayek.  
Their  advocacy  of  methodological  dualism  (MD)  does  not  put  them  in  the  free  
will  camp.  MD has nothing to do with the free will/determinism debate.  MD  is  about  
the  methods  that  must  be  used  to  study  different  phenomena,  namely  human  
choices  (whatever  their  origin)  versus  more  simple  non-­human,  much  less  
complex,  phenomena  commonly  categorized  as  physical  phenomena.  But  this  did  
not  cause  Mises  and  Hayek  to  rule  out  the  determinist  perspective,  as  Block  
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would  have  us  believe.  Indeed,  both  Mises  and  Hayek,  to  varying  degrees,  leave  
the  door  to  the  possibility  of  determinism  wide  open.   
   
IV.  Is  it  Philosophically  Consistent  to  be  a  Libertarian  and  Reject  Free  
Will?   
   
Herbert  Spencer,  Ludwig  von  Mises,  and  Friedrich  Hayek  are  noted  libertarians  
who  reject  free  will.     
   
In  his  essay,  “In Defense  of  Herbert  Spencer,”  the  philosopher  Max  Hocutt  states  
about  Spencer:  “He  would  also  have  regarded  as  absurd  the  proposition  that  his  
embrace  of  scientific  determinism  undermined  the  personal  freedom  he  wanted  
to  foster”.      
   
In  his  magnum  opus  Human  Action,  Mises  makes  very  clear  that  he  does  not  
rule out  the  deterministic  perspective  (The  start  of  Chapter  VI):   
   
“Some  philosophers  are  prepared  to  explode  the  notion  of  man’s  will  as  an  
illusion  and  self-­deception  because  man  must  unwittingly  behave  according  to  
the  inevitable  laws  of  causality.  They  may  be  right  or  wrong  from  the  point  of  
view  of  the  prime  mover  or  the  cause  itself.  However,  from  the  human  point  of  
view  action  is  the  ultimate  thing.  We  do  not  assert  that  man  is  ‘free’  in  choosing  
acting.  We  merely  establish  the  fact  that  he  chooses  and  acts  and  that  we  are  
at  a  loss  to  use  the  methods  of  the  natural  sciences  for  answering  the  question  
why  he  acts  this  way  or  not  otherwise.”   
 
And in an important paper, Gary T.  Dempsey  discusses  Hayek’s  very  sophisticated  
concept  of  determinism  and  why  it  is  that  it  appears  as  though  individuals  act  
with  a  free  will  when  they  do  not:      
   
“Hayek  embraces  a  connectionist  theory  of  mind  that  exhibits  the  trial-­and-­error  
strategy  increasingly  employed  by  many  artificial  intelligence  researchers...Hayek  
recognizes  that  his  epistemology  undermines  the  idea  of  free  will  because  it  
implies  that  the  mind's  operation  is  determined  by  the  evolutionary  interaction  of  
the  matter  that  comprises  ourselves  and  the  world  around  us.  I  point  out,  however,  
that  Hayek  responds  to  this  implied  determinism  by  explaining  that  it  can  have  
no  practical  impact  on  our  day-­to-­day  lives  because,  as  he  demonstrates,  the  
complexity  of  the  mind's  evolution  prevents  us  from  ever  knowing  how  we  are  
determined  to  behave.  Instead,  we  can  only  know  our  mind  at  the  instant  we  
experience  it...   
   
“Hayek's  view  that  the  mind  is  a  complex  adaptive  system  or  ‘spontaneous  order’  
holds  a  significant  implication  for  the  age-­old  controversy  about  free  will—
defined  as  a  will  that  is  not  the  exclusive  and  necessary  result  of  the  interaction  
of  physical  material.  As  far  as  we  have  seen,  the  mind  consists  of  matter  and  
its  relations,  and  since  everything  can  be  realized  in  these  materialist  terms,  there  
is  simply  no  room  for  freedom  of  will.  Indeed,  it  is  another  way  of  saying  that  
our  choices,  judgments,  and  decisions  are   determined  by  the  operation  of  the  
material  that  constitutes  ourselves  and  the  world,  or  as  Oxford  scholar  John  Gray  
summarizes  Hayek's  view,  ‘our  ideas  are  merely  the  visible  exfoliation  of  
Майкъл Еделстайн, Робърт Уензел, Бриджит Салкидо  41 
Списание „Диалог“, 4, 2015 
 
spontaneous  forces’  (1986,  p30).  But  if  this  account  is  correct,  why  should  we  
do  anything  purposeful  at  all?  Doesn’t Hayek’s materialism destroy the idea of 
goal-directed action?   
   
“Not so fast, responds Hayek;;  we  can  never  introspectively  predict  how  our  mind  
is  to  be  determined.  Instead,  ‘we  can  know  [our  mind]  only  through  directly  
experiencing  it’  (1952,  p194).  With  regard  to  the  issue  of  goal-­directed  action,  
then,  Hayek  makes  it  clear  that  his  materialism  makes  no  practical  difference  in  
our  daily  lives;;  we  must  still  conduct  ourselves  as  if  we  are  free  because  we  
can  never  know  how  we  are  meant  to  behave.  Indeed,  “  ‘we  may...well  be  able  
to  establish  that  every  single  action  of  a  human  being  is  the  necessary  result  of  
the  inherited  structure  of  his  body  (particularly  of  its  nervous  system)  and  of  all  
the  external  influences  which  have  acted  upon  it  since  birth.  We  might  be  able  
to  go  further  and  assert  that  if  the  most  important  of  these  factors  were  in  a  
particular  case  very  much  the  same  as  with  most  other  individuals,  a  particular  
class  of  influences  will  have  a  certain  kind  of  effect.  But  this  would  be  an  
empirical  generalization  based  on  a  ceteris  paribus  assumption  which  we  could  
not  verify  in  the  particular  instance.  The  chief  fact  would  continue  to  be,  in  
spite  of  our  knowledge  of  the  principle  on  which  the  human  mind  works,  that  
we  should  not  be  able  to  state  the  full  set  of  particular  facts  which  brought  it  
about  that  the  individual  did  a  particular  thing  at  a  particular  time  (1989,  pp86-
­87).’  “Hayek  thus  salvages  the  idea  of  goal-­directed  action  from  the  grips  of  
materialism  by  maintaining  that  we  cannot  avoid  acting  as  if  we  are  free  because  
we  are  never  in  a  position  to  know  how  we  are  determined  to  behave.  In  other  
words,  Hayek  does  not  assert  that  our  will  is  free,  but  that  we  are  incapable  of  
knowing  how  to  behave  like  our  will  is  unfree”   
   
Thus,  neither  Spencer,  Mises,  nor  Hayek  can  be,  according  to  Block,  libertarians  
or  Austrian  economists  because  they  do  not  hold  a  free  will  perspective!  One  
must  ask,  what  is  left  of  the  Austrian  school  of  economics  and  of  libertarianism  
under  Block’s  rigid  limitations,  other  than  Block  himself?  Spencer,  Mises,  and  
Hayek  are  removed  by  Block’s  restrictions  and  Rothbard  seemingly  is  questionable  
as  to  passing  muster  because  his  view  of  punishment  is  based  on  restitution,  
something  that  a  determinist  could  also  hold  as  a  justification  for  punishment  
and  something  that  Block  does  not  appear  to  consider  as  a  proper  reason  for  
punishment.   
   
That  Block’s  view  of  libertarianism  excludes  many  of  the  seminal  thinkers  in  
the  history  of  libertarian  thought  rates  as  a  fatal  flaw  in  Block’s  conclusions.  
Libertarianism  is  far  more  inclusive  than  just  Walter  Block  and  other  libertarians  
who  support  the  free  will  doctrine.   
   
Spencer,  Mises,  Hayek,  and  Rothbard  are  libertarians  to  the  degree  that  they  
support  the  non-­aggression  principle,  regardless  of  the  views  that  led  them  to  
such  support.  The  core  of  libertarianism  is  support  of  NAP,  not  the  method  by  
which  one  arrives  at  such  support.  All  should  be  welcomed  to  the  libertarian  
camp  who  support  NAP,  regardless  of  their  views  on  the  free  will-­determinism  
debate,  including  Spencer,  Mises,  and  Hayek. 
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